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Abstract
We consider an adverse selection environment between an informed
seller and an uninformed buyer, where no trade occurs when all buyers
are rational. The buyer may be a “behavioral” type in the sense that
he may take actions different from a rational type. We show that,
for any incentive-feasible mechanism with any non-trivial trade, the
buyer’s ex-ante expected payoff is strictly negative. Our result implies
that whenever trade occurs, some behavioral types must incur losses.
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Adverse selection is considered as one of the most important economic phe-
nomena. Akerlof (1970) points out that, even if there exists positive gains
of trade with probability one, essentially no trade is possible in equilib-
rium; Samuelson (1984) shows that such a no-trade outcome can be the
only incentive-feasible allocation (both under certain parameter conditions).
However, there is accumulating evidence that some consumers are behav-
ioral in the sense that they may make suboptimal decisions.1 In the context
of adverse selection, such behavioral agents may improve the total welfare.
For example, Eyster and Rabin (2005) show that, in the environment where
an informed seller trades with an uninformed buyer as in Akerlof (1970) and
Samuelson (1984), if the uninformed buyer exhibits some kind of inferential
naivety (namely, a buyer is “cursed”), then those two parties can potentially
trade with positive probability. However, although the society in total can
enjoy the positive trade surplus, the cursed buyer himself makes a loss (in
terms of his “actual” payoff). Murooka and Yamashita (2020) extend this
setting by allowing the buyer to be either the cursed type or the standard
Bayesian-rational type, and show that not only the cursed type but also the
rational type may be able to trade (even though the rational trader never
trades in the absence of the cursed buyer). By definition, the rational type
enjoys a non-negative expected payoff, while, as in Eyster and Rabin (2005),
the cursed type makes a loss.
A natural question is whether this phenomenon is specific to a particular
type of naivety (i.e., “cursedness”) or is applicable to broader settings. To
answer this question, this paper considers adverse selection with general types
of such behavioral biases. The only assumption is that some consumer types
may take actions that do not necessary optimize own “actual” payoffs, which
encompasses virtually any type of biases including subjective probability,
framing, model misspecification, random errors, and inferential naivety.
1See Heidhues and Kőszegi (2018) on consumer behavior in markets and Beshears,
Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2018) on household decision makings.
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Our main result is the following. Consider an adverse-selection environ-
ment where only no-trade outcome is possible by rational agents. We show
that, if there is any non-trivial trade under a mechanism which is incentive
compatible for the informed seller, then the buyer’s ex-ante expected payoff
must be negative, no matter how the buyer behaves in the mechanism. As
a corollary, because a rational type of the buyer always earns a non-negative
expected payoff, some behavioral types of the buyer necessarily make nega-
tive expected payoffs in the mechanism.
The result may be interpreted as an impossibility result: In the adverse-
selection environment, even though some trade may happen with behavioral
types, it must be at the cost of these types’ losses. Put it differently, the
only mechanism that yields non-negative expected payoff to every type of
the buyer is the no-trade mechanism.
On the other hand, in some situations, the society may accept some
losses of the buyer, if it is compensated by a larger total surplus. Indeed,
Murooka and Yamashita (2020) obtain incentive-feasible mechanisms where
both rational and naive buyers trade even under severe adverse selection,
attaining a strictly higher social surplus under certain conditions. In this
sense, our theorem sheds light on a new trade-off between the social surplus
and payoff losses of behavioral buyers.
2 Severe adverse selection with rational types
A seller has private information about the goods to be traded, denoted by
θ ∈ Θ. The distribution of θ, denoted by F ∈ ∆(Θ), is assumed to be
common knowledge. A buyer has no private information. A (deterministic)
trading outcome is denoted by y ∈ Y , which may include the information as
to which goods are traded, the associated monetary transfers, and so on. The
seller’s ex-post payoff is denoted by uS(y, θ), and the buyer’s ex-post payoff
is denoted by uB(y, θ). The trading outcome includes a “no-trade outcome”
y = 0 ∈ Y , and we assume uS(0, θ) = uB(0, θ) = 0 for normalization. A
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feasible allocation is a stochastic trading outcome, denoted by x ∈ ∆(Y ).
For each i ∈ {S,B}, let ui(x, θ) =
∫
y
ui(y, θ)dx denote the expected payoff
given x.
A fundamental observation in the literature (Akerlof, 1970; Samuelson,
1984) is that adverse selection can be so severe that only no-trade outcome is
incentive feasible by rational traders (i.e., incentive compatible for the seller,
and individually rational for both parties). Our goal is to obtain a different
but related observation in case the buyer is not necessarily rational in the
standard sense.
Specifically, consider an allocation rule (x(θ))θ that satisfy:
• (ICS) incentive compatibility for the seller: for any θ, θ′,
uS(x(θ), θ) ≥ uS(x(θ′), θ),
• (IRS) individual rationality for the seller: for any θ,
uS(x(θ), θ) ≥ 0,
• (IRB) individual rationality for the buyer:∫
θ
uB(x(θ), θ)dF ≥ 0.
Assumption 1 (Severe adverse selection). An allocation rule (x(θ))θ satisfies
(ICS), (IRS), and (IRB) if and only if x(θ) = 0 for (F -almost) all θ.
Example 1. The seller has an indivisible object. A deterministic trading
outcome specifies whether the trade of the object occurs and the associated
monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller. Both parties are risk neutral
in monetary transfer, and hence, an allocation is identified by a pair x =
(q, p) ∈ [0, 1] × R, where q represents the probability of trading the object
and p represents the expected monetary transfer from the buyer to the seller.
The seller’s ex post payoff is given by uS(q, p, θ) = p − qθ, where θ ∼
U(0, 1) can be interpreted as the seller’s opportunity cost of trading. The
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buyer’s ex post payoff is uB(q, p, θ) = qαθ − p, where αθ can be interpreted
as the buyer’s valuation for the object. Assume α ∈ (1, 2).
By the standard argument based on the envelope theorem, the combina-
tion of (ICS) and (IRS) implies:




Then, the buyer’s expected payoff is at most:∫ 1
0
(










which is negative unless q(θ) = 0 for almost all θ.
3 Severe adverse selection with behavioral types
Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Murooka and Yamashita (2020) consider the
situation where the buyer may be “cursed” in that he under-appreciates the
correlation between the seller’s private information and action. They show
that (i) non-trivial trade (and hence a positive social surplus) can occur;
while (ii) the cursed buyer makes a loss.
Although those two papers consider very specific behavioral types, we
show that the same property holds under any kind of behavioral types.
Namely, some buyer type must make a loss unless it is a no-trade mech-
anism.
To formally state our main result, let k = 1, . . . , K denote the buyer’s
behavioral type, where gk ∈ (0, 1) denotes the probability of each type k.
Each type k’s ex-post payoff is given by uB(x, θ), invariant with respect to
k. This means that the buyer’s behavioral type is purely about his action
pattern. We assume that θ and k are independent, which means that the
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buyer’s behavioral type is not informative about the seller’s value.2 Let
x(θ, k) denote the allocation if the agents’ types are (θ, k). For the seller, we
require:
• (ICS) incentive compatibility for the seller: for any θ, θ′,∑
k





• (IRS) individual rationality for the seller: for any θ,∑
k
gkuS(x(θ, k), θ) ≥ 0.
We say that buyer type k makes a loss if
∫
θ
uB(x(θ, k), θ)dF < 0.
Theorem 1. Suppose that an allocation rule (x(θ, k))(θ,k) satisfies (ICS) and
(IRS). Then, unless x(θ, k) = 0 for all k and (F -almost) all θ, some buyer
type makes a loss.
Proof. We show a slightly stronger claim: If an allocation rule (q(v, k), p(v, k))(v,k)
satisfies (ICS), (IRS), and makes the buyer’s ex ante expected payoff (i.e.,
the buyer’s expected payoff before realizing own type) non-negative, then
q(v, k) = 0 for all k and (F -almost) all v.










k gkx(θ, k) for each θ. Then, (ICS) becomes:
uS(x(θ), θ) ≥ uS(x(θ′), θ),
2We think this is a natural assumption. However, generalization to the correlated
case is also possible, as long as we strengthen the seller’s incentive compatibility and
individual rationality to their ex-post version. This strengthening is in order to avoid a
Cremer-McLean type mechanism (Crémer and McLean, 1988), which extracts the seller’s
information rent by asking the seller to bet on the buyer’s type realization.
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(IRS) becomes:
uS(x(θ), θ) ≥ 0,
and the buyer’s ex ante expected payoff becomes:∫
v
uB(x(θ), θ)dF.
Therefore, by Assumption 1, if the buyer’s unconditional expected pay-
off is non-negative, we must have x(θ) = 0 for (F -almost) all θ, implying
x(θ, k) = 0 for all k and for (F -almost) all θ.
Theorem 1 points out a fundamental problem of an adverse selection
environment. Namely, whatever decision rules of the buyer one introduces in
order to avoid the no-trade outcome, such avoidance is possible only at the
risk of some buyer types, or more precisely, at the risk of the buyer’s ex ante
payoff.
Notice that we have little restriction on which kinds of behavioral types
we consider. It includes any type of misinference (Eyster, 2019), inattention
(Gabaix, 2019), random errors such as Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey (2008)
and Gabaix, Laibson, Li, Li, Resnick, and de Vries (2016), or heterogeneous
priors for the value. There may exist multiple kinds of behavioral types
coexisting, with possibly different degrees. Theorem 1 is also agnostic about
the class of mechanisms and the equilibrium concept, as long as the seller is
best-responding. Such non-dependence on mechanisms allows for analogy-
based expectation, framing-based biases, and model misspecifications such
as Jehiel (2005), Ahn and Ergin (2010), Esponda and Pouzo (2016), and
Spiegler (2016).
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